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Mary Wollstonecraft, Public Reason and the Virtuous Republic 
Alan M. S. J. Coffee 
Draft 
Forthcoming in The Social and Political Philosophy of Mary Wollstonecraft, Sandrine Bergès 
and Alan Coffee (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, November 2016, pp. 183-200 
One of Wollstonecraft’s most significant observations was that legal and political rights alone 
would not enable women to secure women’s freedom. A pervasive system of norms and 
social structures had grown up, limiting the opportunities available to women, placing strict 
expectations upon them and reinforcing the established perception that women were not 
suited to acting independently and on their own accounts. Although she was by no means the 
first person to recognise the impact that the cultural environment had in shaping the way that 
we behave, Wollstonecraft’s analysis of its operation and effect was unique. Drawing on a 
republican framework in which freedom is understood in terms of independence from any 
sort of arbitrary power, she showed that we should understand the threat to freedom from 
oppressive ideas and social practices in exactly the same way as that from unjust laws or 
unaccountable rulers, namely that they were arbitrary in the republican sense of not being 
required to reflect the common good.
1
 In each case, the remedy is identical: the dominating 
                                                 
1
 I give a full account of Wollstonecraft’s republican commitments in Alan Coffee, “Mary 
Wollstonecraft, Freedom and the Enduring Power of Social Domination”, European Journal 
of Political Theory, 2013, 12 (2), 116-35, and “Freedom as Independence: Mary 
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power has to be constrained so that it is no longer arbitrary. Ultimately, power is always held 
in check through processes that are guided by public reason or, in a particular sense of the 
term, virtue. This is because what is considered to be arbitrary must be established rationally 
and consensually. While republicans have traditionally focused on legal and political means 
of maintaining freedom, Wollstonecraft shows not only that social and cultural threats, such 
as from prejudice, ignorance and stigma, must not be forgotten but that addressing these is 
logically prior and must be the starting point for a republican conception of freedom.  
 Wollstonecraft is rightly celebrated for her pioneering work advocating women’s 
independence from men. Less widely appreciated is that in building her case she develops an 
innovative model of republican freedom that can be generalised and applied wherever power 
is exercised arbitrarily.
2
 Her model differs in a number of respects from the dominant forms 
of contemporary republicanism. In contrast to Philip Pettit’s influential ideal of non-
domination, for example, Wollstonecraft does not regard freedom as a negative and non-
moralised ideal that expresses a person’s ability to make certain choices reliably. Freedom is 
understood, rather, as a complex ideal that comprises both protections and obligations, and in 
which an idea of individual and collective ‘virtue’ plays an integral role. Virtue, on 
                                                                                                                                                        
Wollstonecraft and the Grand Blessing of Life”, Hypatia, 2014, 29 (4), 908–24. See also 
Lena Halldenius, Mary Wollstonecraft and Feminist Republicanism: Independence, Rights 
and the Experience of Unfreedom, London: Pickering and Chatto, 2015. 
2
 Wollstonecraft herself applies some of the same arguments she uses to highlight women’s 
domination to discrimination against the Dissenters (326-7). See also her analysis of the 
French Revolution (“An Historical and Moral View of the French Revolution”, in The Works 
of Mary Wollstonecraft, Volume 6, Janet Todd and Marilyn Butler (eds.), 1995, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press).  
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Wollstonecraft’s account, is not an instrumental value that is useful, even perhaps 
indispensable, for promoting and maintaining freedom in a population as the prevailing view 
now has it.
3
 It is a component element of freedom itself, so that a free republic is necessarily 
a virtuous republic. While the notion that virtue is part of freedom might strike modern 
readers as at best archaic, if not far-fetched or incoherent, I hope to show that properly 
understood it represents an important and relevant contribution to contemporary republican 
theory. Amongst the current concerns in which Wollstonecraft’s approach can illuminate is 
the question of how to accommodate diversity in socially dynamic and plural populations 
without compromising either collective stability or individual freedom.
4
 This is, of course, a 
complex area that republicans have only recently begun to explore in detail. Nevertheless, 
while a complete republican multiculturalism remains to be fully worked out, I shall venture 
                                                 
3
 Pettit, for example, distinguishes between those institutions that ‘instantiate’ freedom by 
preventing domination, and the “buoni costume” (good customs or morals) that support and 
enable those institutions to function (Republicanism, 1997, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
pp. 106-7, 240-2). The former are part of the ideal of freedom while the latter are 
instrumental to its success. 
4
 In applying Wollstonecraft’s arguments in this way, I in no way suggest that the concerns of 
feminism and multiculturalism are the same or that the arguments from the one field can 
simply be lifted and reapplied to the other. Neither do I overlook the important insights 
Wollstonecraft had into the specific and unique nature of gendered power structures that cut 
across other social and political boundaries. My argument is only that those insights are 
developed within a broader theoretical framework that she herself applies extensively.  
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that Wollstonecraft her work establishes a necessary precondition upon which such a theory 
must build.
5
  
 I shall start by examining some of the distinctive features of classical republican 
freedom, before discussing Wollstonecraft’s conception of virtue, the ways in which virtue 
can be corrupted and then, what it means, and why it is so important, to live in a ‘virtuous’ 
society. Finally, I briefly suggest how her arguments can be extended to form part of a wider 
contemporary republican political theory.   
1. Republican Freedom 
A distinguishing feature of the classical or Commonwealthman conception of freedom, upon 
which Wollstonecraft drew, is that two forms of freedom are always invoked simultaneously, 
the freeman and the free state.
6
 These two ideas are linked and neither is possible without the 
other. In contrast to the now more familiar idea of freedom as consisting in the absence of 
                                                 
5
 A full theory will have to address a broader range of issues than freedom, including the 
claims of group rights, social cohesion, the rule of law, and how to deal with historical 
legacies. The republican literature on this is emerging but still at an early stage. Cecile 
Laborde’s excellent Critical Republicanism examines such issues through the case of the 
Hijab controversy in France, perhaps the most fully developed (2008, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press). See also Frank Lovett, “Cultural Accommodation and Domination”, 
Political Theory 2010, 38(2): 243-267 and Pettit, Republicanism, pp. 143-6.  
6
 This was the conception of freedom used by Wollstonecraft and many of her colleagues and 
co-activists, including Richard Price, Joseph Priestley and James Burgh. I set out the details 
as they apply to Wollstonecraft and Price in anonymous reference. See also Quentin Skinner , 
Liberty before Liberalism (1998, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).  
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interference in a person’s intended actions, the classical conception builds from two 
directions, the individual and the collective. This is because personal freedom is understood 
in relation to a socially-agreed idea of what is in the common good. As a result, freedom 
represents a complex idea with several components. In contrast to Berlin’s belief that 
‘everything is what it is’ so that ‘liberty is liberty’ rather than, for example, equality, fairness 
or justice, republicans understand freedom as a broad term that embodies these other notions 
through the way that social relationships between free individuals are structured.
7
  
 Freedom itself is synonymous with independence, while its opposite, or dependence, 
is equated with slavery. Wollstonecraft uses these terms extensively, and it is central to her 
case that women, by being dependent on men, are not only unfree but are literally slaves. 
Independence has two parts, and we can think of these in light of the two perspectives of the 
individual and the collective. Individuals must be able to think for themselves and make their 
own decisions rather than simply following the direction or influence of others. The issue 
here is not simply that of being compelled to do things one might otherwise not want to do. It 
is, rather that independent people must be capable of scrutinising the ideas, traditions and 
received wisdom of their environment and of forming their own considered judgements. Not 
to be able to do that, according to Wollstonecraft, is to be dependent upon, or captive to the 
other people’s ideas, and therefore to be “slaves of prejudices”, locked into unreflective 
patterns of behaviour that one lacks the capacity to change (219).
8
 It is not enough, however, 
                                                 
7
 Isaiah Berlin, “Two Concepts of Liberty” in Four Essays on Liberty, (1969, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
8
 “It is”, she said, “the right use of reason alone which makes us independent of everything” 
(1992, 219, 230). To submit to an unreflective opinion was to be guided by an arbitrary 
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that people come to form their own opinions. They must also be able to put these into action. 
The right to act independently is guaranteed collectively by the state through the law.
9
 Laws, 
however, are reflections of the minds that create them, and so laws that guarantee 
independence must be made and maintained by people who are themselves independent.  
 Freedom has long been regarded as the central and pre-eminent value in republican 
theory.
10
 Beyond the positive case for promoting, extending and maintaining opportunities 
for independence among the citizens, republican writers have insisted on a negative case. 
Dependence, or slavery, must not be permitted within the political community. There are 
strong moral reasons for this, of course. Wollstonecraft, for example, regards freedom as both 
the natural birth right of all human beings and indispensable for moral behaviour and 
Christian piety.
11
 Alongside to the moral case, however, republicans have traditionally 
offered a self-interested and pragmatic justification. Because freedom is a compound social 
ideal, for it to be possible requires several ingredients to come together at once. These various 
                                                                                                                                                        
principle, since we could not be sure that it was reflective of the common good. It is always 
in our interests, by contrast, to follow reason as the Creator has guaranteed (277). 
9
 For a detailed discussion, see Coffee, “Grand Blessing”. 
10
 This is especially clear in the writing of Richard Price. See also Quentin Skinner, “On the 
Slogans of Republican Political Theory”, European Journal of Political Theory, 2010 9 (1): 
95-102. 
11
 “A Vindication of the Rights of Men” in A Vindication of the Rights of Men and A 
Vindication of the Rights of Woman, Sylvana Tomaselli (ed.), (1999, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, p. 7), and A Vindication of the Rights of Woman (1992, London: Penguin, 
pp. 100-1 and 142-6). Since the majority of references to Wollstonecraft will come from the 
second Vindication, all in-text references will refer to this edition. 
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elements were understood to be internally connected and causally related. The absence of any 
one of its parts would have a corrosive effect that threatened to undermine the possibility of 
freedom altogether. In other words, to the extent that we permit any individuals to be unfree, 
we jeopardise everyone’s freedom. Wollstonecraft herself presents as her “main argument” 
for the rights of women (ahead of her more celebrated moral case) that keeping women in a 
state of servitude posed a serious threat to men’s own freedom.12 Independence was seen as 
requiring two other features in particular. First, there had to be an equality of status between 
the citizens so that no one was either above the law or below its protection.
13
 The second 
element was virtue.  
2. Independence and Virtue 
There is a long republican tradition of emphasising the tie between the freedom of state and 
the virtue of the citizens. Historically, it was said that there was a causal relationship that ran 
in both directions between independence and virtue, with each providing the conditions that 
enabled the other. Just as it was necessary for citizens to show restraint and to support the 
                                                 
12
 Rights of Woman, p. 86. Her analysis of the causes of the French Revolution and the 
ferocity of the subsequent Terror is similarly based on the unequal nature of ancien society. 
13
 Both cases would lead to dependence. Where some people are above the law – and so able 
to circumvent its power to constrain – this leaves the rest of the population dependent on 
them. Wollstonecraft makes this very point in the case of where the rich are able to buy 
favours in parliament (Rights of Men, 20-1). Anyone who is not protected by the law is, by 
contrast, dependent on all those who are. Even wealthy or middle class women, for this 
reason are dependent on men (This is a prominent theme throughout Wollstonecraft’s novel, 
Maria, or the Wrongs of Woman, 2005, New York: Dover).  
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institutions that maintained their independence, so such virtue was said to be something that 
only independent individuals could be relied upon to show.
14
 Arbitrary power was seen to 
undermine, or ‘corrupt’, the virtue of both those who wielded it and those who were subject 
to it.
15
 This focus on virtue has been downplayed in recent years, however, and hardly 
features in the most prominent neo-republican accounts other than in a general way 
connected to the standard models of reasonable behaviour for functioning democracies or as 
derived from the traditional platitude that ‘power corrupts’.16 In contemporary republican 
accounts, virtue typically plays only an instrumental role in providing the background 
conditions against which the necessary republican institutions can operate effectively. 
Wollstonecraft, however, regarded virtue as integral to, and constitutive of, the very notion of 
independence.  
The idea of ‘virtue’ as behaviour that upholds the common good and helps preserve 
the institutions of state is as old as republican theory itself. Nevertheless, its precise meaning 
has shifted over time. At the birth of the Roman Republic, Livy notes that the people were 
not ready for freedom, being little more than a “rabble of vagrants, mostly runaways and 
refugees”.17 They had not had time to develop the necessary character traits and patriotic 
                                                 
14
 This was a constant theme in early republican literature from Roman times, through 
Machiavelli to Wollstonecraft’s own period. See Skinner, Visions of Politics: Volume II 
(2002, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) for a detailed discussion of its importance. 
15
 “Inequality”, Wollstonecraft says referring to situations of dependence, “must ever impede 
the growth of virtue by vitiating the mind that submits or domineers” (Rights of Men, 49). 
16
 Pettit Republicanism, p. 211; Cecile Laborde and John Maynor chapter 1, in Laborde and 
Maynor (eds.) (2008), Republicanism and Political Theory, Cambridge: Blackwell. 
17
 Livy, The Early History of Rome, (1960, London: Penguin. Book II, p. 105).  
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values that would sustain a free state, including respect for the family and a love for the soil”. 
In his Discourses on Livy, Machiavelli develops the concept of virtue (virtù) to embrace any 
action or behaviour that strengthens the republican state virtuous, no matter whether this 
might otherwise be considered immoral or underhanded. “One’s country” he says, “should be 
defended whether it entail ignominy or glory, and... it is good to defend it in any way 
whatsoever”.18 By the end of the eighteenth century, however, the idea of virtue had become 
firmly associated with the capacity to exercise, and to be directed by, reason in pursuing the 
common good, which is considered always to conform to rational principles.
19
 Reason keeps 
our thinking grounded and thereby providing the necessary foundation for virtue, which 
would otherwise be swayed by erroneous, irrational or selfish inclinations. It is as using this 
last sense of virtue as being guided by reason that I shall frame Wollstonecraft’s model of 
political freedom.  
                                                 
18
 Machiavelli, The Discourses, (1983, London: Pelican, p. 514). In this context, the 
adventurer Castruccio Castracani is praised for possessing the following ‘virtuous’ 
characteristics: “he was kind to his friends, and to his enemies terrible; just towards his 
subjects, faithless to foreigners; never when he could win by fraud did he attempt to win by 
force – he used to say that it was the victory itself, not the way in which you had won the 
victory, which brought you glory” (Life of Castruccio Castracani, London: Hesperus 2003, 
33). Castracani’s virtue consisted in his doing whatever it took to defend and further the 
interests of the republic. 
19
 This use features prominently in the writing of both Richard Price and James Burgh. “Did 
reason govern mankind” argues Burgh, “there would be little occasion for any other 
government” so virtuous and happy would we be (Political Disquisitions, 2009, Carlisle, 
MA: Applewood Books Book I, Chapter I).  
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In order to be virtuous, Wollstonecraft argues, one “must only bow to the authority of 
reason” (140-1). This does not say, of course, that reason is sufficient for virtue, or indeed 
that acting in accordance with reason is synonymous with virtue.
20
 In actual fact, both 
‘reason’ and ‘virtue’ in Wollstonecraft’s writing are rich and subtle terms. I cannot here hope 
to do justice to the complexities of either.
21
 My focus is, however, on virtue as a constitutive 
element of freedom as independence rather than its wider set of meanings. Sometimes 
Wollstonecraft speaks of virtue with reference to moral qualities or “human perfections”.22 
She refers, for example to “the love of mankind, from which an orderly train of virtues 
spring, can only be produced by considering the moral and civil interest of mankind” (86). To 
the extent that a viable and decent society requires certain dispositions and behaviours from 
its citizens, this is something that no republican denies and so does not mark Wollstonecraft 
out in any way. But these are instrumentally useful to the maintenance of freedom rather than 
                                                 
20
 Wollstonecraft’s notion of reason, for example, is not that of a detached application of 
abstract logic, but entails the application of rational principles while being guided by the 
imagination, knowledge and experience. When Wollstonecraft asks “in what respect are we 
superior to the brute creation, if intellect is not allowed to be the guide of passion?”, she adds 
that without the “feelings of the heart… reason would probably lie helpless in inactivity” 
(Rights of Men, 31). See Karen Green for much more on this topic (“The Passions and the 
Imagination in Wollstonecraft’s Theory of Moral Judgment”, Utilitas 1997, 9 (3): 271-90). 
21
 The contributions to this journal by Sandrine Bergès and Martina Reuter very helpfully 
explore different aspects of both reason and virtue in far greater detail. 
22
 See, for example, Rights of Woman p. 125, and throughout chapter 5.  
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constitutive of it.
23
 I set these aside and concentrate only on that aspect of virtue that is tied to 
the exercise of reason insofar as it forms part of the meaning of freedom.  
Wollstonecraft gives two sets of arguments for linking the capacity to reason and 
independence. The first is connected to the ability to think for oneself, and the second to 
putting thought into action. While the first of these is important for Wollstonecraft herself, it 
does not affect the structure of her argument as I shall reconstruct it. I shall make no use of it 
and include it here only for completeness.
24
 If we are not governed by reason, Wollstonecraft 
held, we must be governed either by emotion and caprice, or by ideas we have gleaned from 
other people. In both cases we would then be under the control of, and therefore dependent 
upon, forces that could not be relied upon necessarily to lead to behavior that was always in 
our interests. This is the very definition of an arbitrary power, and therefore neither of these 
options is consistent with independence. Reason, however, represented the “the nature of 
things”’, and to use this as our guide was guaranteed to “promote our real interest” which was 
both best for us as individuals as well as being right for society.
25
 Independence requires 
individuals to think for themselves, scrutinising their opinions and motives in the light of 
                                                 
23
 Indeed, Wollstonecraft cautions against treating “virtue in a very limited sense” that makes 
“the foundation of it solely worldly utility” (168-9, her italics). ‘Virtues’ that come about to 
serve particular needs in particular situations often have unintended but harmful 
consequences. This has been especially damaging in the case of the duties of obedience 
imposed on women that in turn result in their being ill-equipped to raise independent 
children. 
24
 I discuss her commitment to this idea in full in “Grand Blessing”.  
25
 1992, 277.  
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reason, rejecting those that they cannot justify.
26
 Wollstonecraft’s thinking here owes much to 
an eighteenth-century rationale that regarded a person’s passions, emotions and subjective 
inclinations as having originated originated outside of their ‘true’ or rational selves. Pursuing 
this line would attribute to her a positive view of freedom as ‘self-mastery’ that is alien to the 
contemporary political discourse that most neo-Roman republicans position themselves 
within.
27
 My aim, however, is not to present Wollstonecraft’s own views in their entirety, but 
to build a ‘Wollstonecraftian’ position that contributes to this current discourse, I shall not 
pursue these considerations further.  
Irrespective of the question of how we form our intentions, if we are independent we 
must be able to put these into practice. In a social context, this inevitably requires the 
presence of a suitable and effective institutional and legal structure within which 
independence is guaranteed. Since the law has coercive force, if it is to uphold rather than 
impede independence it must, like reason, promote or protect our interests.
28
 The law must do 
this for each person over whom it has jurisdiction, since anyone whose interests are not 
promoted would not be independent. For this reason, the republican tradition has always held 
that the law is justified only where it is required always to uphold the population’s common 
                                                 
26
 Rights of Woman, 91-2, 100, 143. 
27
 Pettit, Republicanism, pp. 25-7 
28
 It should be noted that although Wollstonecraft says of reason that it will always “promote 
our real interest”, there is no question of the law claiming to do the same while pursuing the 
private interests of only a few. On Wollstonecraft’s own definition of individual 
independence, individuals must always come to see what is rational for themselves. Unless 
they come to endorse the law’s idea of what is rational, then this cannot be imposed without 
undermining their independence. This would be to violate the very justification for the law. 
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interests.
29
 What these common interests are, however, must be first identified and then 
justified. Ideally, Wollstonecraft says, the citizens would be individually and collectively 
motivated by “reason, virtue, and knowledge”, and would construct their laws accordingly 
(91). In reality, of course, she was all too aware that few of us are so enlightened. However, 
even if they were this would not be sufficient for independence. It is not enough that the laws 
happen to uphold our interests. If we are to be independent, this must be guaranteed. It is 
essential for republican freedom, therefore, that everyone is able to represent themselves and 
their perspectives in public deliberations about what constitutes the common interest.
30
 This 
can only be assured in a particular kind of environment.  
Wollstonecraft herself was wearily aware that, although she made a well-reasoned and 
highly rational case for women’s independence, this alone would never be enough for her 
arguments to succeed. Invariably, other considerations, including people’s prejudices, private 
inclinations and powerful vested interests invariably would come into play and draw people’s 
attention. Indeed, even if some of her arguments had succeeded, this would not be enough to 
secure independence unless there was a guarantee that they had succeeded for the right 
reasons. Women could only be independent in a society in which the best arguments, rather 
than any other factor, always carried the day. Anything less would leave them dependent on 
                                                 
29
 It is when we “consult the public mind in a perfect state of civilization” or virtue, that we 
generate a “government emanating from the sense of the nation”, or the common good, which 
will “be productive of the happiest consequences” (“French Revolution”, p. 212).  
30
 “Who made man the exclusive judge”, Wollstonecraft asks, “if woman partake with him 
the gift of reason?” (87), adding that “women ought to have representatives, instead of being 
arbitrarily governed without having any direct share allowed them in the deliberations of 
government” (265).  
  
260 
the vagaries of those other factors. So although I have said at an individual level, virtue in the 
sense of possessing a capacity and willingness to act in accordance with reason is not 
necessary for freedom, collectively it is a different story. Taken as an entity as a whole, an 
independent republic is a virtuous one. This does not require every individual to be virtuous 
so long as the institutions that define and uphold freedom are properly regulated. There must, 
however, be a sufficient stock of virtue in the community to guarantee the integrity of these 
institutions and to hold them in check. 
The type of reasoning that is required by collective virtue is restricted to what we 
would now call public reason, although Wollstonecraft herself does not use this term. She 
does, however, insist that people must be both able to and prepared to justify the grounds 
upon which they produce in public deliberation in terms that anyone could in principle accept 
(an “obstinate persuasion for which we can give no reason” being nothing more than a 
prejudice).
31
 Furthermore, arguments that are exclusive, such as the claim that women were 
incapable of reasoning, and so their perspectives should not be counted, are not legitimate 
(155). This condition is necessary since if partisan or non-representative principles of this 
kind could be adopted then women (in this case) would be dependent on men by definition 
because they would not be able to represent themselves. They would be left at the mercy of 
men’s discretion and goodwill. In the next section we will see why Wollstonecraft finds this 
so damaging. Since Wollstonecraft does not provide a full specification of public reason, for 
the purposes of this discussion it will be sufficient to think of it in terms of Pettit’s 
formulation, according to which deliberation must be conducted using “cooperatively-
admissible considerations”. These are defined as principles “that anyone in discourse with 
                                                 
31
 “The moment a reason can be given for an opinion,” Wollstonecraft adds, “it ceases to be a 
prejudice, though it may be an error in judgment” (1992, 220). 
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others about what they should jointly or collectively provide can adduce without 
embarrassment as relevant matters to take into account”.32 This approach has the advantage 
of being widely understood today and so allowing Wollstonecraft’s approach into dialogue 
with contemporary republican thinking.  
3. Dependence and Corruption 
Just as independence requires virtue, so traditionally dependence has been said to corrupt it. 
Dependence corrupts not by tarnishing people’s moral character, but by impeding a particular 
disposition to submit to reasoned argument. Traditionally, two causes of corruption have been 
identified, concerning first the structure of motivation that is inherent in dependent 
relationships, and secondly the habits that are formed as a result. Wollstonecraft appeals to 
both, although it is her use of the second that sets her work apart from earlier republican 
treatments. We should also note at the outset that the corrupting effect of dependence affects 
parties on both sides of the relationship, dominator and dominated alike. Wollstonecraft 
stresses that the virtue of dominating men, no less than dependent women, has been 
compromised.  
A virtuous person is defined as one that acts in accordance with the best reasons, 
whether considered from a moral or, as we are taking it, a publicly reasonable perspective. 
This is not always easy to do, of course, and may come at a considerable and unacceptably 
high personal cost. We cannot, Wollstonecraft notes, expect a wife who is completely 
dependent on her husband to act in defiance of his wishes, even where she may have the 
stronger arguments, for fear of losing her livelihood or protection.
33
 It is only where people 
                                                 
32
 Pettit, A Theory of Freedom (2001, Oxford: Polity, p. 156).  
33
 Again, this theme occurs throughout Maria. 
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are secure in their basic rights and social standing, republicans have argued, that they can be 
expected to stand up for a principle instead of putting their own needs and preservation first. 
A woman, Wollstonecraft says in this context, cannot be “really virtuous” without the full 
“protection of civil laws”, and that if she is to “emulate the virtues” expected of a man, she 
must enjoy the same rights (1992, 264, 327).For this reason, it has long been held that 
independence, which entails full and equal legal protection, is a pre-requisite for virtue. This 
is said to be true, moreover, not only in making the sort of difficult moral decisions involving 
self-sacrifice that are often associated with virtue, but also with committing to use and be 
bound by public reason.  
The republican focus on public reason, it must be remembered, is grounded in the 
need to identify the common interests of the citizens, which is the criterion by which the 
arbitrary power they oppose is understood, and then to ensure that this concept is consistently 
applied. Dependent people, however, are, formally speaking, slaves. Their interests, then, are 
not part of the common good at all, which is an ideal that includes only to citizens and 
freemen. Slaves have been left outside the social compact and have no reason to abide by its 
norms or to respect its code of public discourse. Wollstonecraft is explicit about this. As 
slaves, women, have no country because they have no rights, and “without rights there cannot 
be any incumbent duties”.34 Slaves have no reason to respect any of the norms of society that 
excludes them from its benefits. Why, Wollstonecraft asks, would anyone “expect virtue 
from a slave from a being whom the constitution of civil society has rendered weak, if not 
                                                 
34
 Maria, pp. 80-1 (women have no country). Wollstonecraft makes the point about duties 
being tied to rights twice in quick succession, Rights of Woman, pp. 262 and again on 264: 
“Take away natural rights, and duties become null”. 
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vicious?”35 Masters, for their part, have a corresponding motivation to secure their private 
interests rather than submitting to the outcome of public reason. They are in a privileged 
position. The temptation, Wollstonecraft notes, to prefer arguments that justify their 
advantage is almost irresistible. The experience of dominating others is both intoxicating and 
misleading, and “is an insuperable bar to the attainment of either wisdom or virtue”.36 The 
powerful are tempted to surround themselves with “flattering sycophants” who inflate their 
egos and tell them what they want to hear (92). This is doubly damaging, since it means that 
they are often fed lies and misinformation by those around them, also discouraging them 
from facing up to the sort of challenges that would build the skills and character necessary for 
making good, independent decisions.
37
  
The structural inequality between dominator and dominated means that instead of 
being united in seeking the common good, their interaction becomes simply a tactical game 
grounded in mutual suspicion, one-upmanship and the desire for personal gain. Wives, for 
example, being in a subordinate position, cannot reason with their husbands openly but must 
instead resort to cunning, deceit and coquetry to “govern their tyrants by sinister tricks” (100, 
262). The strong must watch the weak very carefully, while the weak are inclined to use 
every opportunity to steal an advantage over their masters. This dynamic not only encourages 
bad habits in individuals but creates a climate that stifles fruitful public deliberation and has a 
devastating effect on public virtue. Rather than seeking to create an inclusive idea of the 
common good, the population divides into competing factions and interest groups. Public 
debate descends into an exercise in rhetoric, propaganda and persuasion. Left unchecked, as 
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we shall see, this has the potential to render rational public deliberation ineffective as a means 
of challenging arbitrary power, and so undermine the very foundations of republican 
independence.  
Wollstonecraft notes two particular tendencies that follow from the breakdown in 
public reason. First, people stop scrutinising the arguments they hear, falling back instead on 
their own prejudices. “A kind of intellectual cowardice prevails”, Wollstonecraft observes, 
whereby “men, in general, seem to employ their reason to justify prejudices, which they have 
imbibed, they cannot trace how, rather than to root them out”. Once these views become 
widespread, they are very difficult to remove because people’s ability to reason becomes 
“clouded” by their prejudice (91). If anyone attempts to correct these falsehoods, or to argue 
against them by going “back to first principles”, their efforts are rebuffed. “A set of shallow 
reasoners are always exclaiming that these arguments prove too much” until “truth is lost in a 
mist of words, virtue in forms and knowledge rendered a sounding nothing, by the specious 
prejudices that assume its name” (91-2). In such an environment, the social elite and other 
powerful groups in society are able to use their influence to promote their own ideas and 
values so forcefully that they become established as the accepted baseline for public 
deliberation throughout society, allowing them to dictate the course that future arguments 
will take.  
The result is the creation of a background cultural environment that exerts a very 
powerful hold over the way that people are able to think and to argue.
38
 Once this happens, it 
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becomes very difficult for opposing or countervailing points of view to even be expressed. As 
an example, Wollstonecraft complains that the suggestion that women might represent 
themselves in government is more likely to “excite laughter” than to gain any support (265). 
Showing just how great the power of ideas is, Wollstonecraft goes so far as to identify the 
belief that women were “created rather to feel than reason” as the source of the endless 
variety of “meanness, cares and sorrows into which women are plunged” (154-5). The 
resulting system of social prejudices and customs, Wollstonecraft describes as a “specious 
slavery which chains the very soul of woman” (261-2).39 It is not only women, however, that 
are affected. “Men and women” are, she argues, inevitably “educated in a great degree by a 
stream of popular opinions and manners of the society they live in”, adding that “in every age 
there has been a stream of popular opinion that has carried all before it” (102).  
4. Public Reason and the Virtuous Republic 
We can now take our earlier observations about the traditional republican emphasis on 
independence a step further. As Pettit notes, historically there was “no other end for the state 
– no other justified end – besides that of furthering this freedom”.40 A republican society 
cannot permit or tolerate any form of arbitrary power within its midst because the dependence 
that this creates has the potential to undermine everyone’s freedom. However, since 
independence can only be secured through appeal to reasoned argument, the state’s most 
                                                                                                                                                        
played upon their superior physical strength to create a myth that legitimates and perpetuates 
the current system of social gender-ordering, providing it with a divine backing (109). 
39
 See Coffee, “Enduring Power of Social Domination” for a detailed discussion of 
Wollstonecraft’s idea of ‘slavery to prejudice’. 
40
 Republicanism, 80.  
  
266 
fundamental goal must be to promote, and to safeguard, the conditions necessary for virtue as 
public reason to flourish. Wollstonecraft shows us that even when we are focusing on 
collective virtue there are two distinct levels at which it enables freedom.
41
 At the first, 
citizens deliberate about their common interests, and define the non-arbitrary laws that are 
used to challenge the unconstrained use of power. More deeply, however, this deliberation 
can only function within a suitably accommodating and representative social and cultural 
background. If freedom is the supreme political value, then ensuring that the conditions 
necessary for this second level of virtue must be the first goal of the republic. To rework a 
well-known slogan, for republicans “the first virtue of social institutions” is virtue itself.  
 Although Wollstonecraft has demonstrated how the collective lack of virtue prevented 
women’s subjection from being articulated and addressed, she does not limit her arguments to 
feminist concerns. “When any power but reason curbs the free spirit of man”, she notes, 
“dissimulation is practiced.” 42  She points to the way that Dissenters had been stereotyped 
and stigmatised in public life drawing a direct comparison with her arguments about women. 
The effect shaped both how dissenters were seen by others which in turn affected the 
characters of the dissenters themselves. 
Oppression thus formed many of the features of their character perfectly to coincide 
with that of the oppressed half of mankind; for is it not notorious that dissenters were, 
like women, fond of deliberating together, and asking advice of each other, till by a 
complication of little contrivances, some little end was brought about? A similar 
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attention to preserve their reputation was conspicuous in the dissenting and female 
world, and was produced by a similar cause. 
Wollstonecraft’s arguments raise an important set of issues for modern democratic societies 
in which social pluralism and cultural diversity are integral features. Since no systematic 
patterns of dependence can be permitted, the members of every social class or group must be 
independent. If they are to be independent, individuals from minority or marginal groups 
must be able to promote their interests as part of a genuinely inclusive common good, voice 
their concerns and defend themselves against arbitrary interference under the law, having a 
fair and reasonable chance of being taken seriously and of having their arguments judged 
impartially. This is a demanding condition, but if it is not met then those citizens whose 
perspectives are not included or represented will be dependent on the rest of the population 
because they will not be able to defend themselves against arbitrary power.  
Independence is only possible in a virtuous deliberative environment, meaning one 
that is substantially free from prejudice and misunderstanding that would hinder rational 
debate. It must be stressed first of all that this does not imply that a republican state must be 
culturally homogenous. A representative and accommodating background culture is not the 
same as a uniform one. Moreover, a shared set of cultural expectations, values and traditions 
is no indication of virtue. After all, Wollstonecraft was writing in what we might regard as a 
fairly uniform cultural setting by today’s standards and yet she identifies both women and 
religious minorities as the victims of sufficient cultural misunderstanding to strip them of 
their voice. No matter how culturally uniform a population may appear to be at a given time, 
its internal divisions can always become the source of disadvantage, stereotype or prejudice – 
based for example, on features such as gender, class, wealth, employment, region, sexuality 
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or religion – that enter unnoticed into the deliberative process.43 Ideas and perspectives 
change over time is, in any case, inevitable and on-going, as beliefs and attitudes shift in 
response to events and experiences.
 44
 What is essential for independence is not what 
background cultural frames of reference people share so much its openness and flexibility 
towards new and divergent perspectives. Since homogeneity could never be maintained, the 
basis for independence must lie in how divisions are handled.  
It will not do for a society to be one in which there happens to be no prejudice or 
systematic social obstacles to freedom such as patriarchy. According to the republican 
standard definition of independence, we must be sure that there are none.
45
 This might make 
independence seem to be an impossible goal. In general, however, the republican solution to 
threats of arbitrary power is not to attempt to remove them altogether – this is rarely possible 
– but instead to seek to constrain that power so that its effects will be non-arbitrary. 
Normally, they turn to the law to constrain arbitrary power, scrutinising its operation through 
the lens of public reason. The law cannot reliably guarantee freedom from social domination, 
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however, because prejudices have the potential to subvert its operation. Nevertheless, the 
republican standard for non-arbitrariness is still applicable. If the effect of the deliberative 
social background is to be non-arbitrary, then the network of ideas and values that shape 
public debate must satisfy the standard test. In the case of the law, it is deemed to be non-
arbitrary only if it is required to be responsive to the shared interests of all those it governs, 
treating everyone as an equal and giving each individual a voice and the opportunity to 
challenge its provisions. The imperative to maintain collective virtue, so that effective 
deliberation is possible has implications for both government and citizens. 
There is, of course, an obvious difference between the deliberative background and 
the law. Whereas the latter consists of a coherent and codified body of principles, the former 
represents an unstructured and open-ended collection of ideas and attitudes that are in 
constant and unpredictable flux. Nevertheless, while the background cannot be controlled in 
the same way as the law, the government can strive to create and maintain an open and 
inclusive environment that is receptive to new ideas and aware of the ever-present danger of 
hidden prejudices by ensuring that citizens from all social groups to have access to the 
important channels of influence, such as education, the arts, the media, law and politics. This 
would allow all sections of the population the opportunity to help reshape the way that their 
interests are presented and understood by others. Over time, and supported by a suitable 
institutional structure, an inclusive, diverse and representative cultural setting can be created 
and maintained in which virtue, as the effective operation of public reason, can support 
individual and collective independence.  
Citizens, for their part, not only have a right to be independent they have an obligation 
to be so. Any form of dependence, whether accepted willingly on the part of the dominated 
party or not is said to have the same corrupting potential. Certainly Wollstonecraft often 
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makes the point to women that they must be independent.
46
 While this is in part a “duty to 
themselves as rational creatures” (262), we can see a theoretical grounding in the preceding 
arguments. Women can only be independent in a society in which their rational arguments 
are heard, understood and have a fair chance of succeeding. That society is one in which 
women’s perspectives have helped shape the public culture so that the kinds of pernicious 
ideas (such as that women are made rather to feel than reason) that impede their freedom 
cannot gain a foothold. It is for this reason that Wollstonecraft calls for a ‘revolution in 
female manners’, led from the front by women who, by reforming themselves, will go on to 
reform the world (133).  
This is one of Wollstonecraft’s conclusions that generalises to other marginalised 
social groups, and which provides a foundational principle for a republican multiculturalism 
that is distinct from most mainstream liberal approaches.
47
 The members of each social group 
have a duty to be independent. If they are to be independent, they must be able to defend 
themselves against arbitrary power using public reason. This means that citizens from all 
social groups, but especially from those whose interests and practices are most misunderstood 
or least accommodated, must play some part in civil society to the extent that they are able to 
ensure that they can be adequately represented in public debate. Citizens from most minority 
groups, of course, would not find this duty burdensome since it is the lack of opportunity that 
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is most often the cause for regret. Nevertheless, the literature on multiculturalism often 
discusses those kinds of groups whose members may wish to distance themselves from wider 
society and to live on their own terms as a separate group. These include, for example, small-
scale indigenous peoples, ethnic or sub-national populations incorporated in past conflicts or 
by colonial expansion, and some ideological and religious communities.
48
 If the price of their 
isolation is that they are not able to resist arbitrary power because there is insufficient mutual 
understanding with the rest of society, then these citizens will be dependent. Even if this is a 
price that the group members are prepared to pay, the potential for virtue to be corrupted 
means that a republican state must be very reluctant to permit such an arrangement. It is no 
justification for permitting dependence that the people concerned, individually or as group 
members, consent to their condition. Contented slaves, after all, are still slaves. 
5. Concluding Remarks 
Wollstonecraft’s insight that social norms and prejudices represented sources of arbitrary 
power just like any other kind of unconstrained power represented an important innovation 
within the classical republican paradigm. It also sets her apart from contemporary republicans 
because it shows that freedom cannot be a solely negative ideal, consisting only in the 
absence of dominating power. Drawing a sharp distinction between ‘contestatory’ and 
‘participatory’ approaches, contemporary republicans typically argue that freedom consists in 
rights to challenge arbitrary power without necessarily entailing positive rights to participate 
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in the shaping of the environment in which freedom is exercised.
49
 While freedom may be 
secured by resisting arbitrary power under the law, Wollstonecraft shows that the cultural 
environment in which the law operates could be corrupted thereby nullifying the law’s power 
to prevent dependence. A non-arbitrary set of background cultural norms, however, must 
necessarily be made collaboratively be members of all sections of the community. Since 
citizens have a duty to preserve their independence, this entails a degree of civic engagement.  
Although the duty to be independent is one that every individual shares, the 
requirements of participation and virtue are collective meaning that they are conditions that 
the citizenry as whole must fulfil without this entailing that each individual member does so. 
It is by no means a part of individual independence that one is actively engaged in promoting 
civic virtue. Nevertheless, it is necessary for an independent republic to have a sufficient 
number of citizens from each constitutive social group have been engaged in this way. In 
seeing independence from both an individual and a collective perspective, Wollstonecraft is 
able to retain the subjective element in which persons are free only where they are able to act 
on their own terms according to their own lights while recognising that this necessarily 
requires a cultural and institutional context that is disposed to bind itself to a genuinely 
inclusive idea of the common good. These two perspectives are integral to the single notion 
of freedom and are causally related to each other. Individual independence presupposes 
collective virtue, and while free individuals need not continually manifest virtue, should 
collective virtue waver they must then act virtuously or lose their freedom.    
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